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Presidential Pronouncements of Customary 
International Law as an Alternative to the Senate’s 
Advice and Consent 
Eric Talbot Jensen∗ 
Abstract: The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States has thus far focused on the status of treaties in 
United States law, and has not specifically considered the topic of 
customary international law. While the American Law Institute 
undoubtedly has good reasons for its approach, there is an emerging 
presidential practice that should catch the attention of the drafters and 
encourage them to make at least a small foray into customary 
international law’s impact on the domestic law of the United States. 
This practice consists of presidents proclaiming to the international 
community that certain provisions of treaties that are currently before 
the Senate for its advice and consent have already achieved the status of 
customary international law and, therefore, are binding on the United 
States, regardless of Senate action. While it appears that the president 
has the constitutional authority to determine what is customary 
international law as part of his foreign relations power, it is less clear 
that he determines the domestic effect of customary international law, 
particularly in instances where Congress has intentionally not taken 
action on a specific treaty. The Restatement (Fourth) has the 
opportunity to clarify the domestic effect of such presidential actions. 
 
* Associate Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School (BYU). The author wishes to thank those 
who attended the BYU Law Review Symposium and provided excellent comments and 
suggestions as well as Grant Hodgson and Caroline Lamb for invaluable research assistance. 
3.JENSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2016  11:08 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1526 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Customary International Law 
B. CIL and U.S. Domestic Law 
II. THREE CASES OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
B. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
C. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions 
D. Conclusion 
III. BINDING EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
B. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
C. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions 
D. Conclusion 
IV. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) AND CLARIFICATION 
A. No Action 
B. Provisional Application 
C. Senate Vigilance 
D. Conclusion 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
3.JENSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2016  11:08 AM 
1525 Presidential Pronouncements of Customary International Law 
 1527 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution tells the 
president that “He shall have power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur.”1 Article VI then states that “all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”2 These two 
constitutional provisions establish the recognized and authoritative 
method for the federal government to incorporate the content of 
international agreements to which the United States is a signatory 
into domestic law. As constitutional practice has evolved, the originally 
strict understanding of these provisions has grown to include some 
controversy on the self-execution or non-self-execution of treaties,3 and 
to allow for the use of executive agreements,4 congressional-executive 
agreements,5 and even sole executive agreements.6 
In addition to these well-documented and thoroughly discussed 
evolutions in constitutional practice, there is a recent development in 
U.S. practice that has not previously been analyzed but that 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 3. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 7–9 (2014) [hereinafter CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32528]; see generally David Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix 
Self-Execution Doctrine, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1691 (2016). 
 4. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 4–7. It would appear that over 
18,500 executive agreements have been concluded by the United States since 1789 (more 
than 17,300 of which were concluded since 1939), compared to roughly 1100 treaties that 
have been ratified by the United States. However, this estimate seems likely to undercount the 
number of executive agreements entered by the United States. As Garcia states, “While the 
precise number of unreported executive agreements is unknown, there are likely many 
thousands of agreements (mainly dealing with ‘minor or trivial undertakings’) that are not 
included in these figures.” Id. at 5. 
 5. Id. at 5; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) (discussing the 
constitutional and legislative significance of both treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements and arguing for greater use of congressional-executive agreements). 
 6. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 6. Though there are fewer of 
these in quantity, they often cause quite a bit of concern when they are made. However, the 
United States Supreme Court has upheld such agreements on several occasions. See, e.g., Am. 
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
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potentially has a significant impact on the larger question of the 
treaty process under the Constitution and the concurrent application 
of customary international law (CIL) as part of the “supreme Law of 
the Land.”7  This emerging practice is a declaration by the president 
that portions of a treaty are CIL and binding on the United States, 
even while that treaty is at the Senate for its advice and consent.  
Three primary examples are sufficient to demonstrate this 
emerging trend in congressional-executive branch interaction: The 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III),8 the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
(APII),9 and Article 75 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (API).10 In all three cases, the president sent 
the treaty for advice and consent to the Senate, which took no 
action. Despite this congressional inaction, or perhaps in response to 
it, subsequent presidents have made statements or taken actions that, 
to greater or lesser degrees, proclaim that certain provisions or all of 
the presented treaties have become part of CIL and are binding on 
the United States and its agencies. The effect of such presidential 
action is to bind the United States, as a matter of international law, 
to apply those treaty provisions. Presidents have then further 
directed various executive agencies to follow these provisions of 
newly minted CIL and provided domestic legal ramifications for 
failure to do so. 
This particular “lawmaking” exercise by the president is unique 
and has not garnered much attention from either Congress or 
academics. Despite recent claims about presidential authority with 
respect to the foreign affairs power,11 no one has claimed for the 
president this application of authority under the Constitution. 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
 10. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 11. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2006) (arguing that the foreign affairs power was understood 
to be part of the executive power at the time the Constitution was ratified); David Gartner, 
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The Restatement (Fourth) has the opportunity to clarify the 
domestic effect of such a presidential statement. This clarification is 
especially significant with respect to presidential statements that 
subsequently become binding on the actions of executive agencies 
and carry legal repercussions for non-compliance. 
Part I of this Article will provide a very basic overview of the 
formation of CIL and its application in U.S. domestic law as the 
“supreme Law of the Land.”12 Though this is a contested area of 
foreign relations law, Part I will make some assumptions in order to 
avoid reengaging in this debate and instead try to distill principles 
that are important to the specific question presented in this Article. 
With Part I as background, Part II will then analyze the three 
previously referenced examples where the president has submitted a 
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent and subsequently, in 
the face of Senate inaction, proclaimed provisions of those treaties or 
those treaties as a whole to be accepted CIL and binding on the 
United States. Part III will further illustrate how subsequent 
presidential actions have had the effect of making those provisions 
binding on executive agencies as a matter of domestic law. Part IV 
will then discuss the relevance of this phenomenon to the 
Restatement (Fourth) and argue that the Restatement has the 
opportunity to address this issue and clarify the domestic effect of 
such presidential actions. The Article will conclude in Part V. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law, at its most basic level, is the law that governs 
the interaction of nations,13 though its competence is gradually 
growing to include many non-state entities, including individuals.14 
 
Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. REV. 499 (2012) 
(examining the rise of the president’s foreign affairs power). 
   12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 101 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (describing international law as the “rules and principles 
of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and 
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether 
natural or juridical”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 1. 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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Modern international law can generally be divided into two broad 
categories: treaty law and custom (or CIL).15  
The next section will focus on CIL. It will be followed by a 
section that discusses the role of CIL in U.S. domestic law. 
A. Customary International Law 
As opposed to treaties which are “international agreement[s] 
concluded between States [meaning nations] in written form and 
governed by international law,”16 CIL is often unwritten law 
governing the actions of nations.17 It comes from the experience of 
history and has often grown and developed over extensive periods of 
time.18 For example, many concepts of modern CIL were first 
espoused by Grotius,19 Gentili,20 Vattel,21 and Pufendorf.22 As these 
 
 15. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. ch. 1, intro. 
note (“International law is made in two principal ways—by the practice of states (“customary 
law”) and by purposeful agreement among states (sometimes called “conventional law,” i.e., 
law by convention, by agreement). Until recently, international law was essentially customary 
law: agreements made particular arrangements between particular parties, but were not 
ordinarily used for general law-making for states. In our day, treaties have become the principal 
vehicle for making law for the international system; more and more established customary law 
is being codified by general agreements. To this day, however, many rules about status, 
property, and international delicts are still customary law, not yet codified.”). Customary 
international law can also be ascertained by an appeal to “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; . . . [and] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.” I.C.J Statute, supra note 15, art. 38(1); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32528, supra note 3, at 1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (stating that in addition to treaties and 
custom, international law may also be derived from “[g]eneral principles common to the major 
legal systems” of the world). 
 16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, ¶ 1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 17. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The Obsolescence of Customary International Law 
(Oct. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2512757 (arguing that CIL is obsolete and should be replaced with international 
agreements and soft law). 
 18. John W. Foster, The Evolution of International Law, 18 YALE L.J. 149 (1909). 
 19. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625). 
 20. ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (John C. Rolfe tran., 
Clarendon Press 1933) (1589). 
 21. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 
Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008). 
3.JENSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2016  11:08 AM 
1525 Presidential Pronouncements of Customary International Law 
 1531 
historical norms are accepted as governing principles in the 
interaction of nations, they enter the realm of CIL. The Restatement 
(Third) acknowledges this reliance on the historical actions of 
nations and proclaims that CIL “results from a general and 
consistent practice of states [known as ‘state practice’] followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation.”23 
Establishing this state practice does not require universal 
compliance,24 but does involve widespread and representative 
adherence, particularly among those nations that are specially 
affected by the norm.25 Practice may be demonstrated in many 
different ways, including “diplomatic acts and instructions as well as 
public measures and other governmental acts and official statements 
of policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation 
with other states . . . .”26 This practice must also be accompanied by 
a sense of legal obligation, otherwise known as opinio juris.27 In 
other words, the fact that nations consistently take some specific 
action is insufficient to create a principle of CIL. Those actions also 
have to be acknowledged by those nations as being legally required. 
The importance of establishing what is and what is not CIL is 
highlighted by the fact that once a norm is accepted as CIL, it is 
binding on all nations who do not persistently object to it.28 This 
means that a nation may become bound by a practice that it does not 
accept as legally required and that it specifically does not adhere to, 
 
 22. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (1672). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 24. Id. § 102 cmt. b. 
 25. Id.; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 
1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 73 (Feb. 20). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 27. See id. § 102 cmt. c (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary 
international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states 
feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law. A practice initially followed 
by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states generally come to 
believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. It is often difficult to 
determine when that transformation into law has taken place. Explicit evidence of a sense of 
legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from 
acts or omissions.”); see also North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 77. 
 28. Trachtman, supra note 17, at 18. 
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unless it has vigorously opposed that notion with respect to its legal 
obligations. And even then, if the principle is found to be a 
peremptory norm, such objection will not spare the nation of the 
legal obligation.29 
B. CIL and U.S. Domestic Law 
The application of CIL to the United States is “ambiguous and 
sometimes controversial.”30 This is true for many reasons, including 
the method of CIL formulation. Scholars and government officials 
have raised the objection that because CIL is an undemocratic 
method of law formulation,31 it should be considered skeptically with 
respect to its binding nature in U.S. domestic law.32 As a counter to 
that skepticism, proponents of CIL point to numerous references to 
international law in both the Declaration of Independence33 and the 
Constitution,34 as well as in The Federalist papers.35 Indeed, the 1900 
Supreme Court Case of The Paquette Habana is famously quoted for 
the proposition that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must 
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of 
 
 29. Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
291, 313–14 (2006). A peremptory norm is a “rule[] of international law that admit[s] of no 
derogation and that can be amended only by a new general norm of international law of the 
same value.” Id. at 297. 
 30. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 2; Saikrishna Prakash, The 
Constitutional Status of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2006). 
 31. Trachtman, supra note 17, at 18–20. 
 32. Nicole Roughan, Democratic Custom v International Customary Law, 38 VICTORIA 
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 403 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815, 871 (1997). 
 33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776) (“That these United 
Colonies . . . as Free and Independent States . . . have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, 
contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which 
Independent States may of right do.”). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–11 (discussing Congress’s power concerning the “law 
of nations” and to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal”); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (discussing 
the president’s power to make treaties—with the advice and consent of the Senate—and to 
appoint ambassadors). 
 35. See e.g. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (“It is of high importance to the peace of 
America that she observe the laws of nations . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) 
(“[I]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”). 
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appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination.”36 
However, just stating that international law is part of our law 
does not answer the question of how it is part of our law and how it 
is to be applied domestically, particularly in the face of other 
competing national interests and constitutional principles. This topic 
has been hotly debated37 and will likely continue to be, even if the 
Restatement (Fourth) decides to directly address the issue. Specific 
judicial tools have been created to help apply CIL in domestic 
courts. For example, it is generally accepted that where a controlling 
statute or executive action exists, CIL is not applicable,38 as 
demonstrated by the “Later in Time” rule39 and the Charming Betsy 
Canon.40 The Restatement (Third) concludes only that  
The President’s authority and duty to take care that a principle of 
customary law be faithfully executed, and the doctrine that a new 
customary law becomes United States law automatically and 
supersedes at least State law, depend on an authoritative 
 
 36. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
37.   Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32; William S. Dodge, Customary International 
Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007). 
 38. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 2 (citing The Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. at 677, 700); see also, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Galo-
Garcia v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (“where a controlling executive or legislative 
act . . . exist[s], customary international law is inapplicable”); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living 
in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 
1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding 
that the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, recognized an individual cause of action for 
certain egregious violations of the law of nations). 
 39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 115 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“It has . . . not been authoritatively determined 
whether a rule of customary international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an 
earlier statute or international agreement of the United States should be given effect as the law 
of the United States.”). However, the Restatement (Third) acknowledges that “[a] new rule of 
customary law will supersede inconsistent obligations created by earlier agreement if the parties 
so intend and the intention is clearly manifested.” Id. § 102 cmt. j. 
 40. The Charming Betsy canon comes from the case of Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy and holds that statutes enacted by Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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determination that the particular principle has in fact become part 
of customary law.41 
Despite the lack of clarity concerning the application of CIL as 
U.S. domestic law and without trying to resolve those concerns here, 
the important point for this Article is that there is at least some 
application of CIL in U.S. domestic law and that the president’s 
proclamation of an international norm or principle as CIL and 
binding on the United States likely carries with it some measure of 
legal importance. Given that assumption, the next part will take 
three examples of such presidential proclamations and provide a 
platform for the analysis of their impact in Part III. 
II. THREE CASES OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 
Over the past roughly three decades, beginning with Ronald 
Reagan, presidents have made statements about the CIL status of 
specific treaties or parts of those treaties in order to bind the United 
States to those provisions, despite the Senate not providing its advice 
and consent. The following sections outline three specific instances 
where this has occurred. 
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
On March 10, 1983, only three months after the completion of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III),42 President Ronald Reagan issued his Statement on United 
States Oceans Policy.43 Despite confirming that he would not seek 
ratification, the president proclaimed that “the convention also 
contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans 
which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly 
balance the interests of all states.”44 In the Statement, the president 
made several pronouncements that effectively adopted the majority 
 
 41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED SATES § 111 
reporters’ note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (internal citations omitted). 
 42. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 8. 
 43. Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Oceans Policy (Mar. 10, 1983), 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083c.htm. 
 44. Id.; see generally George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Impact of the Reagan Administration 
on the Law of the Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1989) (discussing the actions taken by the 
Reagan Administration with respect to different maritime claims as a result of UNCLOS III). 
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of the provisions of UNCLOS III, pointedly excluding the 
provisions contained in Chapter XI45 dealing with the deep seabed 
and its minerals. The Statement contains three important decisions 
concerning the application of provisions of the UNCLOS III: 
First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance 
with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the 
oceans—such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the 
United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off 
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and 
freedoms of the United States and others under international law 
are recognized by such coastal states. 
Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and 
overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that 
is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention. 
The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of 
other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the 
international community in navigation and overflight and other 
related high seas uses. 
Third, I am proclaiming today an Exclusive Economic Zone in 
which the United States will exercise sovereign rights in living and 
nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. This will 
provide United States jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 
nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf. Recently 
discovered deposits there could be an important future source of 
strategic minerals.46 
While the Statement contains the proviso “The policy decisions I 
am announcing today will not affect the application of existing 
United States law concerning the high seas or existing authorities of 
any United States Government agency,” the executive branch—and 
particularly the military—has been conducting its operations under 
the assumption that they were required as a matter of presidential 
directive to apply the provisions of UNCLOS III. In other words, 
 
 45. The Convention is now being implemented together with the subsequent 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 
(July 28, 1994). 
 46. Reagan, supra note 43 (emphasis added). 
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the practice of the United States since has been to apply these 
accepted provisions as CIL and binding domestic regulation.47 
In subsequent actions, succeeding presidents have become even 
more convinced of the value of UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III was on 
the Treaty Priority Lists of both President Bush48 and President 
Obama.49 On May 15, 2007, President Bush officially urged the 
Senate to ratify UNCLOS III,50 arguing that “[j]oining will serve 
the national security interests of the United States, including the 
maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide.”51 In response to 
the president’s call, “[t]he Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
voted 17–4 to” forward UNCLOS III to the full Senate for a vote,52 
though the Senate never provided its advice and consent. 
In June 2012, President Obama made another attempt to get 
the Senate’s advice and consent when six four-star generals and 
admirals (including the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; the 
chief of naval operations; the commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard; 
and the commanders of U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. 
Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command) testified before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.53 Each of these 
commanders urged Congress to provide advice and consent because 
ratification was in the best interests of the United States.54  
This ongoing tension between Congress and the executive 
branch with respect to UNCLOS III might be portrayed as a 
 
 47. See infra, Section III.A. 
 48. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 101 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 866, 869–71 (John R. Cook ed., 2007). 
 49. Letter from Richard R. Verma, Assistant Sec’y of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, to John F. Kerry, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate Treaty Priority 
List (May 11, 2009), http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_bd_2009TreatyPriority
List.pdf. 
 50. George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World’s 
Oceans (May 15, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2007/05/20070515-2.html. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senate Panel Backs Law of the Sea Treaty, REUTERS, Oct. 
31, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/31/idUSN31335584. 
 53. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, “24 Star” Military 
Witnesses Voice Strong Support for Law of the Sea Treaty (June 14, 2012), 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/24-star-military-witnesses-voice-strong-
support-for-law-of-the-sea-treaty. 
 54. Id. 
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prototypical example of the Constitution’s structural separation of 
powers. The ongoing discussions and negotiations must occur 
because both political branches are required for a treaty to bind the 
United States to provisions of international law. Instead it highlights 
how the president has used his “executive power”55 to overcome the 
hesitation of Congress and bind the United States through a 
declaration of CIL to the provisions of the very treaty to which 
Congress will not provide its advice and consent. 
As discussed previously, CIL is formed by state practice that is 
followed from a sense of a legal obligation, or opinio juris.56 The 
International Court of Justice has held that to reach the level of 
supporting the development of a customary norm, the practice must 
be “widespread and representative” and include any states that are 
“specially affected.”57 As evidenced by President Reagan’s statement 
on UNCLOS III discussed previously, the United States not only 
asserts its right to exercise the elements of UNCLOS III, but it also 
expects others to honor that assertion as a matter of law, thus 
demonstrating opinio juris. To emphasize this, subsequent presidents 
have issued directives to executive branch agencies and the military 
to comply with the provisions of UNCLOS III, and to do so relying 
on the fact that their compliance is based on international law and 
that they can expect other nations to recognize the United States’ 
right, as a matter of international law, to make such assertions. This 
action by the United States amounts to a demonstration of state 
practice that is followed through a sense of legal obligation and that 
relies on a belief of reciprocal obligations and authorities by other 
nations, thus confirming the existence of CIL. 
In fact, the Introductory Note to the Restatement (Third)’s Part 
V on the Law of the Sea refers to President Reagan’s March 1983 
statement quoted previously58 and then concludes: “Thus, by express 
or tacit agreement accompanied by consistent practice, the United 
States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions 
of the Convention, other than those addressing deep sea-bed 
 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
   56.  See supra Section I.A. 
 57. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3, ¶ 73 (Feb. 20). 
   58.  See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
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mining, as statements of customary law binding upon them apart 
from the Convention.”59 
The legal result of this is that the president has committed the 
United States to the provisions of a treaty to which the Senate has 
explicitly refused to provide its advice and consent because it thinks 
the legal obligations that would result are ill-advised.60 Although 
presidents have persisted in seeking Senate approval for UNCLOS 
III, at this point, it would be a mere formality that carries little legal 
weight. As the treaty is undoubtedly non-self-executing,61 the 
provisions of UNCLOS III would not normally carry domestic 
effects until further implemented by Congress. Therefore, the advice 
and consent of the Senate would serve the purpose of binding the 
United States as a matter of international law. But, in this case, the 
president has already done that, making Senate action unnecessary 
(except with respect to those provisions that the president has not 
specifically declared to be CIL). 
UNCLOS III is not the only example of presidential action 
resulting in an end-run around congressional inaction that leads to 
binding international legal norms for the United States. President 
Obama has recently done something very similar with Article 75 of 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (API),62 
and with Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (APII).63 
B. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
With respect to APII, President Reagan submitted that treaty to 
the Senate for ratification in 1987 and “recommend[ed] . . . that the 
Senate grant advice and consent . . . .”64 President Reagan 
argued that: 
 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Part V, introductory note (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
   60. See Kristina Wong & Sean Lengell, DeMint: Law of the Sea Treaty Now Dead, 
WASHINGTON TIMES (July 16, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/
16/demint-says-law-sea-treaty-now-dead/?page=al. 
 61. See generally Sloss, supra note 3. 
 62. Additional Protocol I, supra note 10. 
 63. Additional Protocol II, supra note 9. 
 64. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-2, at III (1987). 
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The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts 
to codify and improve the international rules of humanitarian law 
in armed conflict, with the objective of giving the greatest possible 
protection to victims of such conflicts, consistent with legitimate 
military requirements. The agreement that I am transmitting today is, 
with certain exceptions, a positive step toward this goal. Its ratification 
by the United States will assist us in continuing to exercise leadership 
in the international community in these matters.65 
Despite President Reagan’s strong statement of support, the Senate 
has taken no action since. 
In March of 2011, President Obama issued a fact sheet, 
which stated: 
Additional Protocol II, which contains detailed humane treatment 
standards and fair trial guarantees that apply in the context of non-
international armed conflicts, was originally submitted to the 
Senate for approval by President Reagan in 1987. The 
Administration urges the Senate to act as soon as practicable on 
this Protocol, to which 165 States are a party. An extensive 
interagency review concluded that United States military practice is 
already consistent with the Protocol’s provisions. Joining the treaty 
would not only assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the 
international community in developing the law of armed conflict, 
but would also allow us to reaffirm our commitment to humane 
treatment in, and compliance with legal standards for, the conduct of 
armed conflict.66 
This statement by the president that U.S. practice is already 
consistent with the APII’s provisions, combined with the president 
urging the Senate to ratify “to reaffirm our . . . compliance with legal 
standards,” provides pretty clear evidence that the United States is 
applying the provisions of APII as state practice and clearly imply 
that the United Stated is doing so out of legal obligation. In other 
words, President Obama is declaring APII to be CIL and applying its 
provisions as binding on the United States, regardless of the Senate’s 
advice and consent. 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee 
Policy, (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-
sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy (emphasis added). 
3.JENSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2016  11:08 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1540 
C. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
Article 75 of API provides an even clearer example. President 
Reagan also transmitted API to the Senate but stated that it was 
“fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed.”67 API was also the 
subject of an intense Department of Defense review that was 
declassified and disseminated to the public only a few months ago.68 
That review, done in 1985, recommended against ratification.69 And 
so, API is also languishing in the Senate with no prospect of action 
in the near future. However, in the same March 2011 fact sheet 
previously quoted, President Obama stated: 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which sets forth fundamental 
guarantees for persons in the hands of opposing forces in an 
international armed conflict, is similarly important to the 
international legal framework. Although the Administration 
continues to have significant concerns with Additional Protocol I, 
Article 75 is a provision of the treaty that is consistent with our 
current policies and practice and is one that the United States has 
historically supported. 
Our adherence to these principles is also an important safeguard 
against the mistreatment of captured U.S. military personnel. The 
U.S. Government will therefore choose out of a sense of legal obligation 
to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any 
individual it detains in an international armed conflict, and 
expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well.70 
This statement by President Obama directly asserting the legal 
obligation almost certainly has the force of a binding “unilateral 
act”71 and has the effect of committing the United States to apply 
Article 75 as a matter of law in all applicable circumstances, despite 
the fact that the Senate has not provided its constitutionally 
mandated advice and consent. 
 
 67. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-2, at III. 
 68. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, REVIEW OF THE 1977 FIRST ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 (1985). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and 
Detainee Policy, supra note 66 (emphasis added). 
 71. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20). 
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D. Conclusion 
These three examples illustrate an apparently developing pattern 
of presidents turning to CIL as a method of binding the United 
States to treaty obligations when they are unable to get the advice 
and consent of the Senate. If the Senate will not respond favorably to 
the executive’s desire to become party to a treaty, the president can 
direct the executive branch to comply with the treaty’s provisions 
anyway. Then, the president can either imply the legal obligation, as 
with UNCLOS III and APII, or directly state the legal obligation, as 
with Article 75 of API, and unilaterally create just as binding of an 
international obligation as if the Senate had taken its constitutionally 
mandated role. 
III. BINDING EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 
As established in Part II, the president has committed the United 
States to apply specific provisions of treaties to which Congress has 
not provided advice and consent, at least as a matter of international 
law, by effectively declaring all or part of them to be CIL. However, 
as discussed in Part I, the mere declaration may or may not carry the 
weight of domestic law, therefore binding the United States, 
especially for particular executive agencies.72 In order for this to 
occur, the president has to engage in some further action that makes 
his decision binding on the executive branch and punishable upon 
non-compliance.73 Presidents have effectively done this with all three 
of the treaties mentioned above. The next three sections will detail 
how the president has done this. 
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
As previously mentioned, the Senate has never provided its 
advice and consent to UNCLOS III. As a result, under the 
Constitution, the United States is not bound by its provisions, 
beyond the obligations that come with being a signatory to a 
 
   72.  See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
   73.  See id. 
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treaty.74 However, presidential action has had the effect of making 
many of the provisions of UNCLOS III not only binding as a matter 
of CIL but also binding on the members of executive agencies.  
One example of this is the promulgation and enforcement of law 
of the sea provisions as described in The Commander’s Handbook on 
the Law of Naval Operations, or NWP 1-14M.75 The NWP 1-14M 
“sets out those fundamental principles of international and domestic 
law that govern U.S. naval operations at sea,”76 and is “designed to 
provide officers in command and their staffs with an overview of the 
rules of law governing naval operations in peacetime and during 
armed conflict.”77 It is promulgated by the Navy, Marines, and Coast 
Guard,78 and restates the requirement that “[a]t all times, a 
commander shall observe, and require their commands to observe, 
the principles of international law.”79 Presumably, without any 
further implementing actions by the president, his statement that a 
provision of UNCLOS III was CIL would now make it an 
international law principle. As such, members of the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Coast Guard would be bound to observe this principle. 
The legal obligation becomes even clearer throughout the NWP 
1-14M. The NWP 1-14M begins with an explanation of the current 
status of UNCLOS III with respect to the Senate’s lack of advice and 
consent80 but then goes on to assert that “[a]lthough the United 
States is not a party to [UNCLOS III], it considers the navigation 
and overflight provisions therein reflective of customary international 
law and thus acts in accordance with [UNCLOS III], except for the 
deep seabed mining provisions.”81 The subsequent sections then 
rehearse in detail the provisions of UNCLOS III as being the current 
 
 74.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, at art. 18 (describing 
the obligation of signatories not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry 
into force). 
 75. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, & U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (2007). 
 76. Id. at 19. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1. 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. Id. at 11. 
 81. Id. 
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law and practice of the United States,82 even when those provisions 
are not in compliance with the United States’ actual legal obligations 
under the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions83 (the last Law of the 
Sea Convention to which the United States was a party)84 and, 
therefore, legally bound.  To add clarity to the NWP 1-14M, the 
Naval War College issued an “Annotated Supplement” which 
provides footnotes with explanations to the provisions of the NWP 
1-14M.85 One example from this annotated version of the NWP 1-
14M will suffice. As an explanation for the drawing of baselines in 
order to determine maritime zones, the Annotated Supplement 
states: “The current rules for delimiting baselines are contained in 
Articles 5 through 14 of [UNCLOS III].”86 This reference to 
UNCLOS III as the legal regime that governs the Navy’s 
recognition of baselines is a clear indication of the incorporation, as a 
matter of governing executive agencies, of UNCLOS III as a 
binding legal norm. 
Not only has the president’s acceptance and declaration of 
UNCLOS III as CIL become binding on executive agencies but also 
failure to follow these rules carries the potential of punishment, 
including incarceration. While not technically binding on the Navy, 
Coast Guard, and Marine Corps as a statute,87 failure to abide by the 
 
 82. For example, see the discussion of maritime regimes such as territorial seas and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone. Id. at 1–2. 
 83. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
 84. See List of Participants in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280033c69 (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
 85. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (1997), http://www.fichl.org/
uploads/media/US_Navy_Commander_s_Handbook_Annotated_Supplement_1997.pdf. 
Note that the Annotated Supplement is based on the 1995 edition of the NWP 1-14M, not 
the more recent 2007 version of the NWP 1-14M. The Annotated Supplement is in the 
process of being updated. 
 86. Id. at 1-3, n.11. 
 87. The supplement contains the following caveats as to its legal weight: 
Although prepared with the assistance of cognizant offices of the General Counsel 
of the Department of Defense, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, The Judge 
Advocate General of the Army, The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, the 
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief Counsel 
of the Coast Guard, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Combatant 
Commands, the annotations in this Annotated Supplement are not to be construed 
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requirements of the NWP 1-14M could certainly be prosecuted as a 
dereliction of duty in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice,88 punishable by up to six months in confinement 
and being evicted from the military. In this way, the president has an 
easy enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with his 
declaration of CIL, despite the Senate’s refusal to provide its advice 
and consent. 
B. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
APII, by definition, applies only to non-international armed 
conflicts (NIAC).89 These are conflicts that do not involve two 
nations fighting each other, but generally involve one nation fighting 
against an insurgency. NIACs could also involve two or more nations 
working together to fight against an insurgent group,90 even if that 
 
as representing official policy or positions of the Department of the Navy or the 
U.S. Government. 
Id. at Introductory Note. 
Although The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations is a 
publication of the Department of the Navy, neither The Handbook nor its 
annotated supplement can be considered as a legislative enactment binding upon 
courts and tribunals applying the rules of war. However, their contents may possess 
evidentiary value in matters relating to U.S. custom and practice. See The Hostages 
Trial (Wilhelm List et al), 11 TWC 1237–38, 8 LRTWC 51–52 (U.S. Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 8 July 1947–19 Feb. 1948); The Peleus Trial, 1 LRTWC 19 
(British Military Ct., Hamburg, 1945); The Belsen Trial, 2 LRTWC 48–49 (British 
Military Ct., Luneburg, 1945); The Abbage Ardenne Case (Trial of Brigadefurher 
Kurt Meyer), 4 LRTWC 110 (Canadian Military Ct., Aurich, Germany, 1945). 
  In the course of these cases, the question of the status of such official 
publications and the British and U.S. military manuals arose on various occasions. 
Although the courts recognized these publications as “persuasive statements of the 
law” and noted that, insofar as the provisions of military manuals are acted upon, 
they mold State practice, itself a source of international law, it was nevertheless 
stated that since these publications were not legislative instruments they possessed 
no formal binding power. Hence, the provisions of military manuals which clearly 
attempted to interpret the existing law were accepted or rejected by the courts in 
accordance with their opinion of the accuracy with which the law was set forth. 
Id. at 1 n.1. 
 88. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV-23 (2012). 
 89. In fact, APII applies to an even narrower subset of NIACs where the non-
governmental fighting force is “under responsible command, [and can] exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.” Additional Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 1. 
 90. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines NIAC as “protracted armed 
confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more 
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insurgent group is a transnational entity, such as al-Qaeda. The U.S. 
conflict alongside the government of Afghanistan from 2002 until 
the present is a good example of a NIAC. In determining what law 
would apply to detainees in that conflict, the Supreme Court, in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,91 disagreed with the government’s assertion to the 
contrary and confirmed that the conflict in Afghanistan was a NIAC. In 
so doing, the Court recognized that the applicable Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) governed the treatment and prosecution of individuals 
involved in that NIAC who were suspected of violating that law.92 
In accord with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 authorizes the president to “try alien 
unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war and 
other offenses triable by military commission.”93 This authority has 
been exercised by the executive branch, and a number of individuals 
are currently on trial.94 In contrast, despite the Supreme Court’s 
determination with respect to the LOAC applicable to the prosecution 
of detainees in a NIAC, the United States has a policy of trying its own 
service members for substantive crimes such as murder,95 rather than a 
similar LOAC violation that would be applicable to a NIAC.96 This 
policy could be seen as undermining the CIL nature of APII’s 
provisions on prosecution and trial rights in a NIAC.   
 
armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva 
Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the 
parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organization.” How is the term 
“Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS 5 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-
armed-conflict.pdf. 
 91. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 92. Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A 
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 
46, 51 (2009). 
 93. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a). 
 94. See Cases, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMM’NS, http://www.mc.mil/CASES.aspx. (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 95. Rules for Courts-Martial 307(c)(2) states that “[a] charge states the article of the 
code, law of war, or local penal law of an occupied territory which the accused is alleged to 
have violated.” However, the discussion to the same Rule adds: “Ordinarily persons subject to 
the code should be charged with a specific violation of the code rather than a violation of the 
law of war.” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 88, at II-27. 
 96. The Rome Stat. for the Int’l Crim. Court, art. 8(2)(c)(i), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9. 
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However, even though U.S. service members have not been tried 
for violations of the laws of war in a NIAC, the authority to do so is 
clearly established by statute. Article 18 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) has a long history97 and states: “General 
courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law 
of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any 
punishment permitted by the law of war.”98 Thus, insofar as the 
provisions of APII are CIL, U.S. service members could be tried for 
their violation. And presidential actions from President Reagan to 
President Obama all confirm that, for members of the executive 
branch, APII is considered CIL and Article 18 of the UCMJ makes 
prosecution possible for any violators of those provisions.99 
C. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
Finally, a very similar argument can be made for Article 75 of 
API. API applies to international armed conflicts100 and neither 
President Reagan101 nor any successive president has urged the 
ratification of API. While the statement above from President 
Obama shows that he recognizes the flawed nature of API, he goes 
on to argue that “[t]he U.S. Government will therefore choose out 
of a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in 
 
 97. Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S. 
Military Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
During Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REV. 74, 90–101 (2001). 
 98. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 88, at § 818, art. 18, A2–6. 
 99. 10 U.S.C. § 818; see also Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 97, at 108–44. 
 100. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 1. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross states that IACS “exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more 
States.” How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 5 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
 101. In his Letter of Transmittal of APII, President Reagan stated with respect to API: 
I have at the same time concluded that the United States cannot ratify a second 
agreement on the law of armed conflict negotiated during the same period. I am 
referring to Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would 
revise the rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all other efforts 
associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, this agreement has 
certain meritorious elements. But Protocol I is fundamentally and irreconcilably 
flawed. It contains provisions that would undermine humanitarian law and endanger 
civilians in war.  
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-2, at III–IV (1987). 
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Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an international 
armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these 
principles as well.”102 
As argued above, this statement incorporates Article 75 into 
CIL.103 Additionally, the application of Article 18 of the UCMJ to 
violations of CIL, as argued above with respect to APII, makes it 
clear that U.S. service members are not only bound to apply Article 
75 as a matter of law, but can be punished if they do not. And, of 
course, all of this is so, despite the fact that the Senate has the treaty 
before it and is not considering granting its advice and consent. 
D. Conclusion 
These three examples clearly illustrate the impact of presidential 
action with respect to treaties that are before the Senate for advice 
and consent, but for which consent has not been granted. Despite 
the lack of Senate action, presidents have not only effectively 
declared the treaties, or provisions thereof, to be CIL and binding 
on the United States as a matter of international law, but have also 
demanded compliance with their provisions as a matter of domestic 
law with respect to executive agencies and have enforced that 
demand with the possibility of severe punishment, 
including incarceration. 
IV. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) AND CLARIFICATION 
Perhaps little of this situation is alarming to those who are strong 
advocates of the president being the “one voice” in foreign 
relations.104 While the implications of the recently decided Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry105 are still unclear, the Supreme Court’s embrace of the 
president as the “one voice” in foreign relations supports the 
authoritative nature of the president’s declarations as to the United 
 
 102. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee 
Policy, supra note 66. 
 103. See supra Section II.C. 
 104. See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955–56 (2014) 
(analyzing the “one voice” doctrine and then arguing that because it has serious flaws, it 
should be abandoned). 
 105. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
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States’ perspective on the content of CIL.106 Therefore, the 
statements made in Part II should, perhaps, not be troubling. 
However, even for those who advocate the president’s role in 
pronouncing CIL, his role in enforcing those pronouncements 
domestically through punitive means, particularly when the Senate is 
already engaged in the ratification process, may cause pause with 
respect to separation of powers. 
There is some evidence that Congress is starting to get alarmed 
by this presidential pattern. In anticipation of President Obama 
having Secretary of State John Kerry sign the Arms Trade Treaty 
sponsored by the United Nations,107 Senator Bob Corker, who was 
the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee at the 
time, sent a letter to President Obama stating, that “[a]ny act to 
implement this treaty, provisionally or otherwise, before the 
Congress provides its advice and consent would be inconsistent with 
the United States Constitution, law, and practice.”108 
Similar statements could have, but have not, been made by Congress 
with respect to the three treaties analyzed above. However, Senator 
Corker’s comments raise the specter of the appropriateness of executive 
action. Because this is a potentially emerging practice by presidents, the 
Restatement (Fourth) has an opportunity to play a role in shaping what 
the interaction between the political branches should be. 
Three possible options seem to present themselves, though all 
three (and potentially others) deserve a much more thorough 
analysis than it is possible to provide here. First, the Restatement 
(Fourth) could remain silent and allow practice to develop between 
the executive and the legislature. Second, the Restatement (Fourth) 
could reconfirm the obligation of the United States to not defeat the 
 
 106. Id. at 2086. 
 107. Michelle Nichols, Kerry Signs U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, Says Won’t Harm U.S. 
Rights, REUTERS, (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/25/us-un-
assembly-kerry-treaty-idUSBRE98O0WV20130925; Arms Trade Treaty, opened for signature 
June 3, 2013. (As this Article goes to press, there is no available U.N.T.S. citation information 
for this treaty. A copy of the treaty can be found at https://treaties.un.org/
doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012-01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf.). 
 108. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Corker Warns Obama 
Admin. Against Any Action to Implement U.N. Arms Trade Treaty Without Senate Advice 
and Consent (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/corker-warns-obama-administration-
against-any-action-to-implement-un-arms-trade-treaty-without-senate-advice-and-consent. 
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“object and purpose” of a signed treaty, even while awaiting advice 
and consent from the Senate. In doing so, the Restatement (Fourth) 
could endorse the president’s role in declaring certain treaty 
provisions to be CIL and implementing those CIL provisions while 
awaiting Senate action. Third, the Restatement (Fourth) could 
confirm the lack of domestic effect of unratified treaties and urge 
presidential caution and congressional vigilance with respect to 
implementing treaty provisions absent congressional action. 
A. No Action 
Because this is an emerging interaction between the president 
and the Senate, the most cautious, and probably most appropriate 
course of action for the Restatement (Fourth) to take is to remain 
silent and await further developments. This is especially prudent 
given Senator Corker’s recent acknowledgement of this evolving 
presidential practice and his warning thereto. As the Restatement is 
meant to be a statement on what the law is, as opposed to what it 
should be or might become, this would appear to be the approach 
most in line with current Restatement practice. Some attention could 
be drawn to the emerging practice in the commentary, while not 
proposing solutions. Such a course of action would identify the issue, 
while not getting ahead of the practice as it develops. 
The drawback of such an approach would be, of course, to draw 
attention to the recent presidential action without making a 
statement about it. This could be interpreted as tacit approval for 
presidential action, even if that was not the intent of 
the Restatement. 
B. Provisional Application  
As previously noted, signatories to international agreements, 
though not bound to apply the provisions of the treaty or 
convention until the domestic ratification process has been 
completed, are still “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose” of the agreement.109 Though the actual 
 
 109. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 18. The 
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but generally accepts Article 18 as 
CIL. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES pt. 3, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“This Restatement accepts the Vienna 
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meaning of “object and purpose” is unclear,110 if it has any meaning, 
it likely precludes any actions that would undermine the actual treaty 
itself. Neither the Restatement111 nor any official U.S. statement has 
taken the position that Article 18 requires or even allows certain 
actions by the president. In fact, Professor David H. Moore has 
argued that this international law obligation forces the president into 
an unconstitutional act when signing a treaty prior to receiving the 
advice and consent of the Senate.112   
The current version of the Restatement (Fourth) contains a 
proposed Section 104 which is titled “Entry into Force of 
International Agreements” which comments on the application of 
the “object and purpose” obligation. The article states: 
(2) A state may also be subject to international obligations 
arising from an international agreement (a) if it has expressed its 
consent to be bound by some or all of the terms of the agreement, 
by means consistent with the agreement, on a provisional basis 
pending the agreement’s entry into force, or (b) if it is subject to 
interim obligations under the agreement arising from its signature, 
exchange of instruments, or ratification, provided that such 
provisional application or interim obligations have not been 
terminated by it or otherwise ceased to be binding.  
(3) While the United States may assume international 
obligations in accordance with (1) or (2), the status of these 
 
Convention as, in general, constituting a codification of the customary international law 
governing international agreements. . . .”). 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 312 cmt. i (AM. LAW. INST. 1987); see generally David H. Moore, The President’s 
Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598 (2011); David S. Jonas and Thomas N. 
Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 565 (2010). 
 111. The Restatement (Third) argues that “[f]ailing to dismantle a weapons scheduled to 
be dismantled under the treaty might not defeat its object, since the dismantling could be 
effected later.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 312 cmt. i (AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
 112.  See Moore, supra note 110; see also Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247 (2012) (arguing that the president should seek “prospective advice 
and consent” from the Senate, prior to negotiating and signing an international agreement, as 
a method of improving the chances of ratification and the timeliness of such ratification). 
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obligations under U.S. domestic law remains subject to the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.113 
Paragraph (2)(b) allows that a state can be bound to certain 
obligations internationally by a signature on a treaty, paragraph (3) 
leaves the domestic effect of that signing unstated. 
 Comment f to draft Section 104 makes clear that this provision is 
intended to deal with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention (which it 
says the United States accepts as CIL).114 The comment states that 
“[t]he scope of such interim obligations, however, has remained 
unclear, in particular as to the nature of the acts prohibited.”115 The 
comment then goes on to state: “Potential issues relating to the 
compatibility of the interim obligation with U.S. law, including 
whether adherence to the interim obligation requires legislative 
authorization or may be based on the President’s constitutional 
authority, have not been resolved.”116 In other words, it is unclear if 
the obligations under Article 18 would provide the president with 
sufficient authority to begin enforcing them as previous presidents 
have done with UNCLOS III, API, and APII. 
 Additionally, Section 104(2)(a) contemplates that a state may 
become subject to an international agreement’s obligations on a 
“provisional basis.” In essence, this is what the various presidents 
have done with the treaty provisions analyzed above, though not 
through “means consistent with the agreement.” Instead, the 
president has, through the means of declaring those treaties or treaty 
provisions as CIL and then making them enforceable domestically 
against executive agencies, accomplished the same effect as a 
provisional acceptance.   
Assuming it is not per se unconstitutional for the president to 
make provisional declarations that bind the United States as a matter 
of international law,117 it would be easy for the Restatement (Fourth) 
to add a similar comment that recognizes the president’s authority to 
 
 113.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 104 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 114.  Id. § 104 cmt. f. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. § 104 cmt. e. 
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also bind executive agencies as a matter of domestic law. Such 
language might be something like the following: 
If consent of the Senate or approval by Congress is required for the 
entry into force of an international agreement but has not yet been 
obtained, an undertaking that it shall have provisional effect for the 
United States, both as a matter of international and domestic law, 
must normally rest on the President’s own constitutional authority. 
If the Restatement (Fourth) took this approach, it would be, in 
effect, making a legal determination as to the constitutional 
correctness of the president’s course of action.  This would be a bold 
statement in an area of executive-legislative interaction that is 
relatively new and unsettled, and the writers of the Restatement 
(Fourth) may not be ready to make that leap. 
C. Senate Vigilance 
Comment j to Section 312 of Restatement (Third) states: “An 
international agreement made by the United States in the form of a 
treaty enters into force for the United States when the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, has ratified it or otherwise 
given official notification of assent to it . . . .”118 This reinforces the 
constitutional requirement that treaties become the “supreme Law 
of the Land”119 only after “the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate,”120 or other accepted congressional involvement, such as in 
congressional-executive agreements discussed previously. 
The Restatement (Fourth) could make the clear distinction 
between provisional application of unratified treaty provisions in 
international and domestic law and draw attention to the recent 
presidential actions, noting that such action may, in fact, be violative 
of the Constitution’s separation of powers paradigm. This could be 
accomplished in any number of ways, including by adding language 
such as the following: 
If consent of the Senate or approval by Congress is required for the 
entry into force of an international agreement but has not yet been 
 
 118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 312 cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
 119. U.S. CONST., art. VI. 
 120. Id. art. II, § 2. 
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obtained, an undertaking that it shall have provisional effect for the 
United States, as a matter of international law, must normally rest 
on the President’s own constitutional authority. Provisional 
application of non-self-executing agreements as a matter of domestic 
law would require Congressional action. 
As with the previous suggestion, it seems bold for the 
Restatement to step into this discussion in such a decisive way since 
the resolution of the constitutionality of the president’s actions is 
still unclear.   
D. Conclusion 
Because this is an emerging trend in presidential-congressional 
interaction, taking no action is most likely the best approach for 
the Restatement (Fourth). However, the action by successive 
presidents to bind executive agencies, including punishments for 
non-compliance, deserves at least some consideration by the 
drafting committee and the American Law Institute (ALI) more 
generally. If no action is warranted at this time, the ALI should at 
least take note of the developing practice in preparation for the 
Restatement (Fifth). 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has documented recent presidential action to bind 
executive agencies to treaty provisions that have not been ratified 
but are currently before the Senate for its advice and consent. 
Three specific examples highlight this emerging practice. It seems 
clear that the president has the authority to direct provisional 
application of these provisions as a matter of international law, but 
his authority to do so as a matter of domestic law appears 
unresolved. Congress has, at least on one occasion, warned the 
president to take no such action until the Senate has completed its 
constitutional responsibility. 
The Restatement (Fourth) has several options with regard to 
this emerging practice, including taking no action, supporting the 
president’s approach through the “object and purpose” 
obligations of signatory nations, and clarifying that provisional 
application of non-self-executing agreements as a matter of 
domestic law requires congressional action. The first approach—
to take no action and see how the practice develops between the 
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two political branches—seems the most prudent at this time. 
However, the ALI should at least take note of the developing 
practice and, perhaps, promote greater discussion on the issue in 
preparation for the Restatement (Fifth). 
